

Orwell's stature has been ever-increasing in the more than seventy years since his early death. Through *Orwell's Roses'* heightened attention to Orwell's life as a lover of nature, Solnit has greatly enlarged our understanding of him. If I may be permitted a personal remark, I treasure some fallen rose petals that I gathered from the rose bush planted in a country churchyard by Orwell's grave.

Peter Stansky  
Stanford University

*Europe, An Open Drama and a Space for Friendship.* By Victor Pérez-Díaz (Madrid, Analistas Socio-Políticos, 2021), available for free download at <https://www.asp-research.com/es/europe-open-drama-and-space>.

Between 1939 and 1945, 6 million Jews were murdered, and 6 million German men, women, and children died from warring violence, as did 3 million young French and German men in the trenches from 1914 to 1918. In 1945, Germany's GDP was what it had been in 1908. The French GNP in 1945 was what it had been in 1891. In 1944, Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, proposed, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's agreement, that Germany should be stripped of its industries and cease to be an industrial power. Europe was exhausted by its immediate catastrophes, as well as by its history: In 1562, Philip II of Spain (1527–1598) wanted to “save” a Catholic Europe with his Invincible Armada of 1588; he even purchased Titian's *The Rape of Europa* to drive the point home. Other nation-states with varying goals and at a horrid financial and human cost also tried to “rape” Europe—France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte), imperialist Britain, Germany (under Adolf Hitler), and the Soviet Union (under Joseph Stalin). “Balances of power” invariably broke down. Many pacifists—Henri IV of France (1553–1610), Castel de Saint-Pierre (1693–1748), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, et al.—labored in vain to explain how Europe might become forever tranquil.

America's Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at Harvard commencement in 1947 was a turning point in this unhappy history when he announced that America would loan 12 billion dollars to revivify not just Germany but Europe as a whole (Britain, France, and Germany received one-half of this money.) Marshall's plan also required that the European nation-states institutionalize their financial arrangements and, soon afterward, their politics. The Cold War and the Iron Curtain made it imperative for America that France and Britain agree to rebuild a strong Germany. In 1950, the French and the Germans signed an agreement to operate their coal and steel industries together. In 1957, pursuant to the treaty of Rome, the Benelux countries, Germany, France, and Italy vowed to work for a deep economic integration of their varying economies. For a variety of reasons, they also

decided to create supranational institutions, among them a European Court of Justice, a parliamentary assembly (eventually to become the European Parliament), and a “European Commission,” which is today a European-wide government. Given those developments, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are unlikely to vanish, and we can only hope that they will continue to co-exist peacefully and prosperously.

In 1985, Jacques Delors, now best known for the Erasmus project supporting education and sport for youths in Europe, furthered the integration of Europe’s various national economies. So did The Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In 2002 “Euro-cash” emerged as the currency of Western Europe. The European Union (EU) is now more than seventy years old. It has its problems: Populations vary from Germany’s 81 million to Cyprus’s less than 1 million, and income per capita in Amsterdam is more than twice that of Budapest. But it has managed to discover some basic principles, such as unity with subsidiarity, and international regulations with national supervision. Its VAT now works from nation to nation. It has acquired a common currency. It also has its heroes—Robert Schuman and Jean Monet in the 1950s, in addition to Delors and Mario Draghi, whose “whatever it takes” mantra helped to save the euro.

Europe’s trajectory from complete misery in 1945 to continuous prosperity in 2021 is not the task of Pérez-Díaz’s message, although he does begin with it. His critical task is instead to describe how Europe has unwittingly learned to think “post-nationally.” Western Europe, despite Brexit, is comprised of functioning nation-states *and* a functional international “quasi-state.” Uniting Europe began as an elite project, but it is poised to become more aware of its Demos. The Europe of the last seventy years has been the scene of compromise, adjustment, and corrective. Pascal Lamy, for example, once a high French civil servant, explained in 2017 that he had once been what Charles de Gaulle labeled, with ancient and elegant disdain, a “technocrate apatriote” (a stateless technocrat). But Lamy can now claim to be both French *and* European. His task, he explained, had been to move from the Napoleonic “solid and hierarchic ... to a decentralized system based on compromise,” to mix “French wine with European water,” to allow action to find its course, and, in brief, “to listen.” The recent debates about managing Europe’s economic crisis have demonstrated both the interconnections between the economics of different countries and the difficulties of finding a common discourse about the subject between countries.

The heart of Pérez-Díaz’s book considers the many ways in which the “clear debates” about Europe, and the EU, took root and grew historically: Gracián (1601–1658) and his baroque approach please him more than do René Descartes (1596–1650) and his rigidities. Pérez-Díaz writes of “anamnesis,” reminiscence, and patriotism rather than nationalism, and, in a nod to Marcel Proust, “an opportunity for the experience of recovering and incorporating past times,” and spaces. Elites, he argues, must be more patient. They are often contemptuous of a national

Demos, but they have to be more patient with Europe's larger Demos: Pérez-Díaz credits Achen and Bartel's *Democracy for Realists* for showing that the political class, which often marginalized populist "common sense," can start to rely on the common sense of ordinary people.<sup>1</sup> Lamy, in 2017, wrote in much the same terms: "Façonner un demos européen."<sup>2</sup> Over time, Pérez-Díaz suggests, "the counterposition will not prove as fundamental as it appears now."

For Pérez-Díaz, to ignore the "mythopoetic" and the "crypto-religious" is to deny a substantial part of the cultures that have pervaded political experience for generations. Elites have been indebted to a past "in which we were absent," and could also face a future "in which we shall be absent." A "culture of caring for others" is his goal. In this brief and learned book, Pérez-Díaz considers Feodor Dostoyevsky's tribute to Alexander Pushkin in which the issue was not to divide Slavophiles from Westerners but, on the contrary, to fuse them fully. But the Russians had inherited an urge for domination combined with a religious compulsion. What Russia tried to do belligerently in the past, a Europe of nations, elites, and Demos in a united Europe might accomplish peacefully. In brief, this important book has a message of hope for Europe and, alas, a message of warning for today's post-Trumpian United States.

Patrice Higonnet  
Harvard University

*Enemies of the People: Hitler's Critics and the Gestapo.* By J. Ryan Stackhouse (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2021) 332 pp. \$39.99

Although there has been an extensive literature about the Gestapo, the German secret police of the Nazi era, Stackhouse's extremely careful analysis—based on extensive research in the accessible archives and the relevant secondary literature—will certainly be of interest to anyone with a focus on the extraordinary years of Adolf Hitler's rule of Germany. Because the case files and related records of the Duesseldorf area in the Rhineland have survived exceptionally intact, Stackhouse explored that area in great detail, but by no means exclusively. In fairness to readers of this review, its author should mention that in the years he repeatedly spent time in the Düsseldorf area from 1934 to 1938 because his maternal grandparents (a retired senior judge and his wife) lived there.

A detailed introduction precedes an account of the beginnings and early activity of the Gestapo, with an emphasis on a major aspect of the author's perspective, the principle of selective enforcement, a practice

1 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government* (Princeton, 2016).

2 Lamy, "L'Europe doit s'attaquer de front au défi anthro-politique," *Revue d'économie financière*, CXXV (2017), 39–52.